Use cases

Support investigations with a disposable AI agent

A support agent looks up the payment, ticket or thread behind a customer question and writes the cause and the next step for your team. Ephemeral starts a fresh microVM for each question, gives it one read-only connection with only the methods you allow, reserves the budget before it starts and delivers the result by signed callback or API, then destroys the machine.

A payment investigation took 12 seconds and cost $0.007651, measured on October 7, 2026 with openai/gpt-6-luna (3 model calls, 5,101 tokens).

What the run is allowed

Everything a run can touch is listed in its request. This is the request of the sample AI payment failure investigator: why did this payment fail?.

Filesplaybook.md (read-only)
Connectionspayments: GET only; credentials stay outside the machine
Web accessephemer.al, search off
ShellOff
Budget$0.04 per run, reserved before it starts
Timeout90 seconds

How to run it

Start a run with the API or the CLI. The result arrives by signed callback or when you read the run.

POST /v1/runs
{
  "workflow": "investigate-payment",
  "input": {
    "payment_id": "pay_123"
  },
  "max_cost_micros": 40000
}

Samples

Each sample is a complete request you can read, replay and copy.

Recipe

Recipe: investigate a failed payment walks through the same job step by step.

Related terms

  • Credential broker: Ephemeral holds a connection's credentials and adds them to each request, so the token never enters the machine.
  • Run budget: The most a run may spend, reserved up front and enforced while it runs.
  • MicroVM: The small virtual machine each run gets fresh and that is destroyed when the run ends.

Questions

Can the agent refund a payment or change a ticket?

Not unless you let it. The connection lists the methods it may call, and the support samples allow only GET, so a refund request is refused by the connection even if the model is tricked.

Does the agent ever see our API key?

No. Ephemeral holds the credentials and adds them to each request outside the machine, so the key is never in the sandbox for a prompt to extract.

What if a customer message tries to hijack the agent?

The prompt-injection sample runs exactly that case: a ticket that asks the agent to send its key to an attacker and issue a refund. It has no key to send, a read-only connection and one allowed domain, so neither action can succeed.

Prices are on the pricing page.

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